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Abstract
This article explores different theoretical and political dimensions of voice in democratic theory.
Drawing on recent developments in political theory, ranging form James Bohman’s work on the
movement from demos to demoi in transnational politics, to William Connolly’s writings on
pluralization, it develops a critical account of the emphasis within conventional pluralism on the
representation of extant identities. Instead, it foregrounds the need to engage with emerging
identities, demands, and claims that fall outside the parameters of dominant discursive orders.
Building on the works of Rancie`re and Cavell, it highlights the importance of an analytical
engagement with the emergence and articulation of new struggles and voices*the processes
through which inchoate demands are given political expression*so as to counter the ongoing
possibilities of domination, understood here as a ‘deprivation of voice.’ The article develops an
account of the centrality of the category of responsiveness to such claims and demands for
democratic theory, especially in relation to a range of democratic struggles in our contemporary
world. In so doing, it contributes to a growing body of work that questions the taken for granted
character and status of the institutional forms of liberal democaracy.
Keywords: pluralism; demoi; Connolly; Rancie`re; responsiveness; deprivation of voice;
domination; Cavell; democratic subjectivity; demands; claim-making
The democratic experience is . . . one of a particular aesthetic of politics. The
democratic man is a being who speaks, which is also to say a poetic being.1
What if there is a cry of justice that expresses a sense not of having lost out in an
unequal yet fair struggle, but of having from the start been left out.2
INTRODUCTION
The terrain of democratic theory can be conceived of as that domain in which the
central questions at stake are those concerning ‘voice’: who can speak, when, in what
capacity, for whom, with what legitimacy, in what tone? Questions of this sort can be
proliferated endlessly, and it is the task of democratic theory to do so. In this article
I explore the question of voice in democratic theory in the light of recent work on
pluralism. I thus seek to offer an account of voice that is compatible with a
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conception of democracy that is open to radical pluralization. This will take us onto
what has been called the terrain of ‘the new pluralism.’ The new pluralism, as
I understand it here, incorporates the concerns of the old pluralism*conventional
pluralist theory as it evolved in the British and North American contexts*but it
seeks to extend pluralism beyond its traditional concerns to highlight ‘closures in
political theory that exclude possibilities for thinking critically about existing
constellations and the multiple ways in which they can be reconfigured.’3 This
‘new pluralism’ is associated, inter alia, with the work of a range of contemporary
political theorists, including William Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, and
Jacques Rancie`re, on whose writings I will draw freely to develop my arguments.
Although there are many tensions between these thinkers,4 which are important
and should not be ignored, I seek to draw together insights from these sometimes
divergent thinkers thus enacting the ethos of generosity and engagement informing
and sustaining this new pluralism.5 In this spirit I also endeavor to bring
considerations highlighted by the ‘new pluralists’ into a conversation with con-
temporary deliberative political theorists, whose works are situated somewhat
uneasily between the old and new pluralism. Throughout these engagements I will
explore different dimensions of the politics of voice: not only what it means to have
voice and to speak, but also what it means to be heard. Whilst questions of ‘voice’
have traditionally been concerned with a focus on the representation of many voices
and hence with inclusion,6 I want to advance the argument that such concerns
should be supplemented with an engagement with the possibility of a deprivation of
voice. The former is the register in which much deliberative democratic theory
operates and which sets the tone for its normative demand that is expressed in the
ideal of full inclusion*the representation of all affected*whilst the latter concerns
questions of exclusion and sets out normatively to re-focuses our attention on
possibilities of domination. These nuances are important, not only theoretically, but
also politically, since they focus our attention on different aspects of the question of
voice. While an emphasis on inclusion tends to focus our attention on a politics of
recognition of extant identities, and thus seeks to include as many voices as possible
within a pluralist democratic space, an emphasis on domination as the deprivation
of voice seeks to alert us to the ongoing possibilities of exclusion within existing
democracies through a politics of pluralization and responsiveness to demands from
those who do have not lost out in ‘an unequal yet fair struggle,’ but have a sense of
‘having from the start been left out.’
In this way, I explore different theoretical and political dimensions of an
understanding of voice, moving from pluralism*the representation of given
identities and interests*to pluralization, a term that indicates a concern with
‘emerging constituencies that press to allow a new identity, right, good, or faith to cross
the threshold of legitimacy.’7 Such pluralization is indispensable in our contemporary
world, both within existing Western democracies that find the normative and
institutional frameworks in which their conceptions of democracy are rooted being
questioned, and in the wider world where those struggling for a sense of control over
their own lives find themselves in a context in which their very struggles cannot be
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heard and understood as democratic. In the latter case, there is need for a loosening
of the institutional requirements for democracy that are being promoted today by
forces from the USA and the EU, with their respective ‘democracy promotion
programs,’ while in the former there is a need to interrogate the limits of how we
conceive of political struggles. Both cases call for a critical attentiveness to the
possibilities of ongoing domination that cannot be discerned simply from ‘within,’
from the perspective of those who already have and hold democratic rights. This
article is thus concerned with the difficult process of the emergence and articulation
of new struggles and voices, as well as with the requisite responsiveness to these
claims, and the demands they place on the way in which we theorize and practice our
democratic politics.
VOICE: THE POSSIBILITY OF IT REPRESENTATION
In democratic theory, voice is often treated under the category of representation. It is
not accidental that there is such a resurgence of attention to the question of
representation today.8 As many commentators have made abundantly clear, it is
precisely in a context in which there is an abundance of new demands and a
proliferation of new sites of contestation, as well as an increased awareness of
diversity and plurality, that questions of representation are raised anew and that we
need to think again about the criteria of representation that are deployed in the
various sites of democratic representation.9 Drawing on a vast array of empirical
studies and developments Castiglione and Warren for instance note the increasing
demands for group recognition as well as demands related directly to people’s needs,
characteristics and identities, coupled with more informal structures and opportu-
nities for democratic representation. Together they necessitate a rethinking of the
problems and potentials of political representation under these emerging conditions.
Indeed, Castiglione and Warren go so far as to suggest that what is at stake here is the
theory of representation in democracies.10
Whilst much recent work in this area has taken the form of a rereading of Hannah
Pitkin’s seminal work on representation, several authors have also endeavored to
highlight areas of analysis where Pitkin’s work needs to be further deepened and
supplemented. These areas are related to the symbolic work of representation,11 as
well as the theoretical structure of the representative relation, arising from the
paradox of representation. Runciman puts it thus:
At the heart of the idea of political representation lies an intractable puzzle,
which . . . I will call the paradox of presence. This is not a formal or logical paradox,
but a linguistic one, and has its roots in the etymology of the term: ‘re-presentation’
implies that something must be present in order to be ‘re-presented’ but also absent
in order to be ‘re-presented’.12
Developing this paradox, a number of authors draw on Derrida’s work on writing and
communication to suggest further that the absence of the represented from the place
of representation is not a mere empirical feature of the process of representation, but
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also harbors an ontological or structural impossibility. As Derrida puts it with respect
to the structure of the written mark of communication:
To be what it is, all writing must . . . be capable of functioning in the radical absence
of every empirically determined receiver in general. And this absence is not a
continuous modification of the presence, it is a rupture in presence, the ‘‘death’’ . . .
of the receiver inscribed in the structure of the mark. . . . What holds for the receiver
holds also, for the same reasons, for the sender or producer.13
Post-structuralist inspired writings have tended to flesh out the paradox of
representation through a deconstructive reading that highlights the impossibility of
a full or pure representation, and its implications for the manner in which the relation
of representation, as well as the identities of the represented and representative
are theorized.14 Deliberative theorists have made a serious contribution in elaborating
what these insights might imply for the practical organization of democratic
representation and deliberation, and the manner in which we need to rethink the
criteria for democratic representation outside of traditional sites of political
representation. Both of these are important, indeed crucial, if one is to begin to
address the complexities of the issues at stake here.
Seen from the perspective of my inquiry into the question of ‘voice,’ there are a
number of important features of this renewed engagement with representation that I
wish to reflect upon. Despite the sophistication of work in this area, the very question
of the subject of representation is paradoxically both raised and effaced. This is visible
in two key assumptions that have increasingly been put into question in con-
temporary democratic theory, namely, that of a coincidence between voice and
subject (or between the author of the law and the citizen-subject), which goes along
with the given character of the represented. With respect to the former, recent work
on representation devotes considerable attention to the positions from which we
speak, and hence the subject positions we occupy. Much theoretical and empirical
work has investigated the impact of such enunciative positions upon democratic
forms of representation, placing particular emphasis on the fact that each one of us
occupies multiple subject positions simultaneously, and that at any one time, in
seeking representation, we may emphasize one such position over another or over a
set of others.15
There is also a further acknowledgment of the need to think about the ways in
which practices of representation themselves constitute ‘the people.’16 Pettit, for
instance, in a recent paper, notes that ‘there is no collective will-formation without
collective will-construction.’17 Similarly, Laclau’s recent work focuses almost entirely
on the theoretical and conceptual issues raised by the construction of the category of
‘the people.’18 Nevertheless, in much work in this area, the question of subjectivity
and its relation to representation is not fully developed. While recent work in this
domain constitutes a significant advance over untenable assumptions of ‘essentialist’
identities, there is still a risk of not taking the constitutive non-completion of the
subject and its consequences for democracy seriously enough. This is particularly
evident in deliberative democratic theory, where the pluralization of the subject of
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democracy has not been accompanied by a simultaneous deepening of the
conceptual apparatus of the constitution of subjectivity. This deepening is required
if the full implications of a radical pluralization of democratic politics is to be taken
on board.
The important work of James Bohman is instructive in this regard for he explicitly
thematizes the move from demos to demoi in order to address what he rightly sees
as one of the key problems of (international) politics, namely the vulnerability of
persons to domination despite their status as citizens.19 I will return to this
characterization of domination at a later point. But here I wish to consider in
more detail why and how Bohman foregrounds the movement from demos to demoi.
For Bohman, this move entails two important elements. The first is a recognition of
the fact that the ‘very idea of a self-legislating demos, of citizens ruling and being
ruled in return, requires a delimited political community of citizens, consisting of all
those and only those who are full citizens and thus both authors and subjects of the
law.’ Hence, the idea of the self-legislating demos also entails an ideal of a
coincidence between subject and author of the law, which nevertheless ‘constitutes
a fundamental gap in any real democracy.’20 To accommodate either the demands of
political inclusion at the global level, or to be applicable to large scale, complex and
pluralistic societies, Bohman suggests that both the assumption of a single demos, and
with it that of a single deliberative forum must be abandoned.21
Historically this has taken the form of an institutional decentering along two
dimensions. At a micro level there is a proliferation of decision-making sites and
processes, while at the macro level there are ‘interlocking levels of governance’ that
‘do not resolve themselves into some higher order convergence.’ Hence, we have
a movement from the demos as singular to demoi. The latter, for Bohman, is
particularly, though not exclusively, associated with and appropriate to transnational
polities.22 In order to develop his account of transnational politics, Bohman draws
upon a federalist republican tradition of democratic thought where the polity is not
understood ‘in terms of the self-governance of citizens as members of a single demos,’
but rather in terms of multiple and overlapping demoi, where there is no institutional
requirement that all must participate in the same set of institutions.23 According to
Bohman, this offers a less juridical and better way to think about democracy since it
allows one to specify a ‘democratic minimum,’ which is sufficiently demanding but
which is not overly prescriptive about the precise institutions and roles needed in
a democracy.24 It thus facilitates a shift away from a set recipe of democratic
institutions that need to be promoted in the international domain.25 This view has a
clear advantage especially with respect to its emphasis on the need to avoid being
overly prescriptive in terms of the precise institutional form democratic arrangements
should take. In this respect, his work echoes that of others, and traverses the
traditional divide between deliberative and agonistic models of democracy.26
Despite the pluralizing movement from demos to demoi, coupled with the emphasis
on the opening up of the institutional terrain, questions remain about the limits of
the underlying conception of pluralism that informs this movement. The risk here is
that the unicity associated with the demos is carried over to each of the demoi. Hence,
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there may be a multiplication of demoi, but it may still be a pluralization of a very
conventional kind. Much here depends on how exactly the question of voice is
treated and in what relation it stands to democracy. In this respect it is notable
that Bohman develops his account against both a top-down gradualism that he
argues seeks ‘to democratize cosmopolitan law,’ and a ‘transformationalism’ that
seeks to replace legislation with contestation as a mechanism for democratization
under the circumstances of globalization.27 Particularly important for our purposes is
that Bohman’s ‘federalist’ republicanism shuns what he sees as a ‘bottom-up’ strategy
that begins with ‘robust transnational civil society as the non-juridical basis for an
alternative to the subordination of all to institutions of public law.’28 This approach,
he suggests, is inadequate since it lacks ‘any account of success and of the ability of
publics to entrench their claims institutionally’; it amounts to mere ‘piecemeal
resistance’29 rather than (proper) democratization. Instead, he proposes a concep-
tion of democratization that focuses on ‘vigorous interactions between publics and
institutions’ as an ‘ongoing source of democratic change and institutional innova-
tion.’ Two sets of questions arise here: (1) how is this ‘vigorous interaction’ to be
understood? How does it take place? And (2) how, and does it result in democratic
change and institutional innovation? To put it differently, if the problem is one of
potential domination, is the conception of pluralism underpinning Bohman’s
account of democratization as ‘the development of powers, statuses and freedoms’
strong enough to address potential sources of domination?
To address these questions we need to look more closely at how Bohman fleshes
out his republicanism. We have already noted the requirement of democratization
rather than piecemeal resistance, that is, the requirement that the distribution of
powers of decision making could be transformed.30 This is what he calls ‘recursive
democratization,’ which results from the interaction of publics and institutions.
Bohman explains the process as follows:
When the institutional alternative implicitly addresses a different public than is
currently constituted by evolving institutional practice and its consequences, the
public may act indirectly and self-referentially by forming a new public with which
the institutions must interact. Such interaction initiates a process of democratic renewal
in which publics organize and are organized by new emerging institutions with an
alternative set of political possibilities as a new political form. This is a difficult
process.31
Bohman cites examples that may approximate this process.32 In addition, he suggests
that the key issue here is ‘whether or not someone has the normative power to make a
claim that others will genuinely deliberate about’33 and this comes down to whether
someone has the ability to initiate deliberation, which is something reserved for
the citizen and absent from the slave.34 This ‘capacity to begin,’ following Arendt,
provides for Bohman the ‘basic measure for the statuses and persons required
for democratization.’35 It entails both the capacity to amend the basic normative
framework and the power to ‘set an item on an open agenda and thus to initiate joint,
public deliberation.’36
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Bohman is no doubt correct to assert that the capacity to begin is crucial: a
necessary if not sufficient condition of having a democratic voice. However, the issue
is more complicated than he suggests. At a crucial point in the argument he falls back
onto the citizen/slave distinction as inaugurating that right: the citizen has it, the slave
does not. As Bohman puts it, ‘whatever freedoms are granted the slave, she remains
dominated and thus lacks any intrinsic normative authority even over herself; at best,
she may only respond to the initiatives of others.’37 The solution follows quickly. It is
to ‘affirm humanity in ourselves and to address the humanity in others,’ which is
operationalized by the capacity to amend the normative framework of the polity and
to initiate joint public discussion. This argument is, however, circular. It notes the
problem of domination and then overcomes it by invoking the capacities of citizens in
a democratic polity. In this way it precisely avoids the issue of domination in its most
common form, namely, that of the deprivation of voice, which occurs both in non-
democratic and in constitutionally democratic polities. I now turn to discuss the
question of voice and its deprivation (rather than representation) before returning
again to an account of democratic pluralization.
VOICE: FROM CONSTITUTIVE DIVISION TO DEPRIVATION
[I]n order to understand the political, we have to discern the mere voice on the one
hand and speech, the intelligible voice, on the other. There is huge divide between
phone and logos, and everything appears to follow from there.38
Mladen Dollar notes that ‘the very institution of the political depends upon a certain
division of the voice, a division within the voice, its partition.’39 It is crucial to note
this constitutive division of voice if we are to develop a sufficiently radical conception
of democratic pluralization. There are many different routes one may follow from
here. These include an exploration of a certain primacy of voice in the phenomen-
ological tradition, so decisively problematized in Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena,
which is not without consequence for what one could conclude concerning the
character of voice in democracy and in democratic theory. The argument I wish to
develop here does not follow the Husserlian picture of the full and transparent
presence of the self to the self in unmediated voice.40 Nor does it endorse the political
variant of this argument that over-valorises the self-present voice found in non-
representational accounts of democracy, by seeking to locate and ground democracy
in the immediacy of the voice. Moreover, it seeks to question the denial of the human
voice in philosophical discourse, which paradoxically also marks Derrida’s engage-
ment with Husserl and Austin even at the very moment in which he sets out to
question the metaphysics of voice as self-presence.41 Rather, I would suggest that
from its very beginnings in classical political theory ‘voice’ is divided. To put it
differently, there is no pure, original moment or site in which the voice is present to
itself; there is no immediacy which can be clearly heard without mediation and which
we have somehow lost in contemporary societies.
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But if voice is not unitary, neither is it only or simply a matter of a multiplicity of
voices with which we have to contend. As I have suggested earlier with respect to the
move from demos to demoi, it is not sufficient to move from the thesis of a unicity of
voice, and with it the possibility of its full representation, to that of a multiplicity of
voices and a multiplication of sites of representation. Whilst important, this move
would nevertheless run the risk of simply multiplying the number of voices, each
of which may still be conceived of in unitary terms. Rather, the thesis of voice as
inherently divided, means not only that we need to take account of the multiplicity of
voices that clamour for our attention, but also that we need to be aware of and think
through the consequences of the division of voice, of every voice.
This requires an approach to the issue that does not simply assert a set of
ontological possibilities as if political consequences could somehow be read off from
those possibilities. Rather, careful attention must be given to the question of political
articulation.42 The point here is the following: nothing automatically follows from a
certain set of ontological presuppositions. They are important in so far as they alert
us to and allow us to deepen our understanding of the possibilities of the deprivation
of voice. This acknowledgment, however, does not lead in one or another political
direction. Arguments could be made, politically, to close off this space of openness,
or indeed to celebrate and extend it. Which of these possibilities is eventually taken
up depends upon complex processes of political articulation, and the latter raises
important analytical issues. To avoid an overly abstract discussion of the issue, let me
turn to the writings of two theorists*Jacques Rancie`re and Stanley Cavell*each of
whom in different ways demonstrates acutely what is at stake here.
The question of voice, and its division or partition is vividly presented in
Rancie`re’s reading of Pierre-Simon Ballanche’s writings (dating from 1829) that
recount the tale told by Livy of the secession of the Roman plebeians on the Aventine
Hill. Livy’s tale ‘links up the end of the war with the Volscians, the retreat of the plebs
over the Aventine Hill, the ambassadorship of Menenius Agrippa, his famous fable,
and the return of the plebs to order.’43 For Rancie`re, the significance of these events
as retold by Ballanche lies in the fact of Livy’s inability ‘to think of the event as
anything other than a revolt, an uprising caused by poverty and anger and sparking a
power play devoid of all meaning.’44 Livy is not able to supply the meaning of the
conflict because he does not put it in the right context, namely, that of ‘a quarrel over
the issue of speech itself.’ Rancie`re suggests that Ballanche, in his retelling of the tale
and by focussing on the discussions of the senators and the speech acts of the plebs,
effectively restages the conflict as one in which the ‘entire issue at stake involves
finding out whether there exists a common stage where plebeians and patricians can
debate anything.’45 This is the crucial question that is at stake in thinking about
domination from the point of view of the possibility of having voice in a democracy: is
there a stage upon which plebs and patricians could debate anything, and if so, how
is this possible? How is the common stage, which cannot be assumed always already
to be in place, to be instituted? Rancie`re’s own account of politics focuses precisely
on this possibility of the staging of demands, of the becoming visible of demands that
have no business being heard or seen. It is through this lens that he rereads
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Ballanche’s account as one in which the plebs move from a position of not being
able to appear on the stage as speaking beings, to one in which they claim or verify
the right to be counted as speaking beings. They move from a position in which what
they could utter could only be understood or heard as ‘noise’ to one of ‘having
speech.’ As Rancie`re puts it:
The position of the intransigent patricians is straightforward: there is no place for
discussion with the plebs for the simple reason that plebs do not speak. They do not
speak because they are beings without a name, deprived of logos  meaning, of
symbolic enrolment in the city. . . . Whoever is nameless cannot speak. . . . Between
the language of those who have a name and the lowing of nameless beings, no
situation of linguistic exchange can possibly be set up, no rules, no code of
discussion. . . . The order that structures patrician domination recognizes no logos
capable of being articulated by beings deprived of logos, no speech capable of being
proffered by nameless beings, beings of no ac/count.46
For the plebs to make the transition from nameless beings to those with speech, they
have to verify their equality through staging a non-existent right. This they do, inter
alia, through giving themselves names, through consulting oracles, through speech
acts that link ‘the life of their bodies to words and word use.’47 I will return at a later
point to this important question of the mechanisms that allow movement from noise
to speech, from inaudiblity to audibility, for it has important implications for how we
think of democracy and democratic activities, as well as the norms we postulate and
how we postulate them.
For the moment, it is necessary to take note that this account of the division
between plebs and patricians, between those with and without speech, is not
something that Rancie`re thinks is a historical feature of our past that has been or
could be overcome. Rather, it is constitutive of democratic political community:
Democracy is the community of sharing, in both senses of the term: a membership
in a single world which can only be expressed in adversarial terms, and a coming
together which can only occur in conflict. To postulate a world of shared meaning is
always transgressive.48
Hence, for Rancie`re politics is a matter of
conflict over the existence of a common stage and over the existence and status of
those present on it. It must first establish that the stage exist for the use of an
interlocutor who can’t see it and who can’t see if for good reason because it doesn’t
exist. Parties do not exist prior to the conflict they name and in which they are
counted as parties. . . . Politics exist because those who have no right to be counted
as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by
the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this
confrontation.49
Much more needs to be said about this and in particular about Rancie`re’s conception
of democracy. It is clear, for instance, that Rancie`re has little patience with the
ordinary business and concerns of democracy. Nor does he think it has anything
to do with participation,50 or with an ethos or a way of life. Despite the apparent
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distance of his concerns from most of what falls under democratic theory today,
I wish to insist on his relevance, for he is one of a very few theorists who persistently
raises the question of the limits of political community, which is a matter of voice, of
whose voice may be heard and of how the space of argumentation itself it delimited.
It is these questions that fall out of the picture when we limit ourselves to the
concerns of citizens of already extant democratic states, for these concerns negate the
basic question of domination. Domination occurs both outside democratic states and
inside well-established democratic polities, and is usefully thought here through the
category of voice: there is domination where there is deprivation of voice.
A no less political example is discussed by Cavell, who provides us with a
differently inflected discussion of what it means to suffer deprivation of voice. In his
reading of Ibsen’s A Doll’s House, Cavell aims to capture the difficulty of expression of
senses of injustice that do not fit the parameters of current moral and political
discourse. In the play, Nora struggles to express her sense of injustice to Thorvald,
her husband of eight years. When challenged by him as to why she borrowed money
in secret and then skimped on household expenses to repay interest, she says: ‘it’s
hard to say; I really don’t know*I’m so bewildered about it all. All I know is that
I think quite differently from you about things.’51 And, ‘I know quite well that most
people would agree with you, Thorvald, and that you have warrant for it in books;
but I can’t be satisfied any longer with what most people say, and with what’s in
books. I must think things out for myself and try to understand them.’ Thorvald, in
turn, questions her having a moral sense, and accuses her of ‘talking like a child,’ like
one who does not understand the world she lives in, so depriving her of a voice.
Through the example of Nora, Cavell captures the experience of a sense of injustice
that is inexpressible in the terms of prevailing discourse but where, as he puts it,
misery is clearly unmistakable. It is important to note that on Cavell’s characteriza-
tion, the deprivation of voice is not the work here of a scoundrel, but of moral
consensus itself.52 And then the question arises: what does one make of such an
experience in a context governed by a democratic grammar? Cavell argues that Nora
here stands as an exemplar.53 She embodies a claim exceeding existing discourse, one
that acts as a call to open ourselves up to other, foreign possibilities since there are no
readily available responses to her. The given terms of discourse would simply require
of her to submit herself to an intolerable denial of her voice. Hence, it is not
satisfactory simply to repeat, ‘this is just the way we do things here.’
In questioning the adequacy of responses such as this, Cavell alerts us to the fact
that Nora’s claim, even if it fails to find expression in the dominant discourse,
nevertheless has an impact upon it, provoking an engagement with her claims. If such
a claim is denied, one will at the very least have to restate the terms and reasons for the
denial of the claim. In this situation, Cavell argues, one will have become aware of the
‘painful distance’ from ‘perfect justice’ in the current order.54 The prevailing order
cannot simply be affirmed: it will be marked by the engagement. Closure cannot be
complete here. It is precisely here that Cavell’s account moves us beyond a focus on
the interruptive, to the consequences of such interruptions for thinking through the
demands of democratic subjectivity, of which the need to acknowledge such senses of
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wrong, is a key moment.55 This responsiveness lies at the heart of the democratic
relation: the demand and the ability to respond, the response-ability to respond to
inchoate articulations of senses of wrong.56
As is clear from the foregoing discussion, a focus on domination as deprivation of
voice highlights several aspects that are important to our concerns. As Bohman
suggests, it is a matter of being attentive to the ‘normative power to make a claim.’
However, the different aspects of this normative power need to be addressed. It is not
simply a matter of having the status of a citizen. Rather, we need analytically to focus
on the practices of claiming such a status.57 Of critical importance in this regard is the
staging of claims and demands, highlighted by Rancie`re. This directs our attention
to the intricate political processes involved in the articulation of claims, which
potentially take us beyond the terrain of a ‘piecemeal resistance’ to a more serious
engagement with the ordinary.58 Both Rancie`re and Cavell also highlight the issue of
the constitution of the identities of the addressee and the claimant in the process of
the articulation of claims. The discussion of the staging of demands must also entail a
critical engagement with the extant dominant order (the order of the police, for
Rancie`re, and the voice of moral consensus for Cavell), which facilitates a focus upon
other dimensions of the politics of democratic claim-making, such as the demand of
responsiveness, so clearly expressed in Cavell’s discussion of A Doll’s House.
Attention to all of these areas is crucial if a sufficiently strong account of pluralization
that is capable of challenging domination*conceived here as the deprivation of
voice*is to be developed. I now turn to a more in-depth discussion of these issues,
first taking up the question of practices of political articulation, before returning to
the implications for the way in which we think of democracy.
VOICE AND ITS VERIFICATION
It is important to note that Rancie`re does not simply state the limits to democratic
community as an ontological presupposition. Rather, it is something that becomes
visible through the verification of equality. Hence, thinking about the limits of
democratic community and of questions of inclusion cannot proceed through a mere
‘logical’ deconstruction, nor is it a matter of thinking from the ‘inside’ of the demos,
from the position of a part who has a part, about the need for inclusion. To put it
differently, the limits of a democratic community only become visible from
enunciative positions that fall outside it, from speech acts by the part of the
community who has no part, who is of no account.59 If, however, such limits are
only made visible from an outside, how does it occur? This takes us back to the
question posed but not answered by Bohman, namely, that of the ‘vigorous
interactions between publics and institutions’ as an ‘ongoing source of democratic
change and institutional innovation.’ Bohman, we have seen, poses this question, but
does not provide us with an account of the mechanisms of democratic change and
institutional innovation.60 My reading thus far has suggested that Rancie`re’s account
of the movement from inaudibility to audibility of the slaves on the Aventine Hill may
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be of some help. It highlights an awareness of the closures that are present even on
stages of argumentation that consider themselves governed by an ethos of inclusion. It
is in this respect that the force of the new pluralism, as conceived by Connolly and
others, is felt. What is at stake is precisely an ethos of attentiveness to the ways in
which existing political constellations may need to be reconfigured. All too often,
insights such as these are brushed aside as a mere concern with an ethos, with a
sensibility that, apparently, does not have much to offer besides itself. However, if the
narrative of the Aventine Hill is taken seriously, the potentially radical impact of an
ethos of attentiveness to the possibility of a deprivation of voice comes into clearer
focus. What is at stake here is an aspect change from one that views freedom as
something granted, to that of freedom claimed by the part who has no part. Let us now
turn to a further example, which highlights how this movement from invisibility to
visibility, from mere noise to voice, takes place. And to avoid the charge that the
example of the slaves on the Aventine Hill is too extreme, let us turn to a more
commonly experienced occurrence.
As is the case in much contemporary democratic theory, Rancie`re turns to an
example of the articulation of political demands in relation to extant law. More
precisely, he explores the strike of the 1833 tailoring workers who went on strike
because the master tailors refused to respond to their demands relating to pay,
working hours, and conditions. This is familiar enough territory. This strike took
place in the aftermath of the revolution of 1830 in France, where there was a
proliferation of working-class publications, pamphlets and newspapers, all asking the
same question: are the French people equals or are they not? The manner in which
Rancie`re reads these events, however, departs in significant ways from standard
treatment of claims to inclusion.
Rancie`re reads the proliferation of working-class publications that went hand in
hand with strike activity as texts intervening in an argument in the form of a syllogism.
The work of this syllogism is not that ‘it replaces strife by talk. Rather, it establishes a
common space as a space of division.’ Rancie`re outlines one possibility of construing
the syllogism in this case as follows:
Major premise: The Charter promulgated in 1830 says in its preamble that all
French people are equal before the law.
Minor premise: M. Schwartz (head of the master tailor’s association) refuses to listen
to the workers’ case and their demands for improved pay. His refusal means that he
is not treating the workers as equals.
Therefore he is contradicting the equality inscribed in the Charter.
In this instance, the major premise contains what the law has to say, whilst the minor
premise denotes what is said or done elsewhere, in a manner that contradicts the
fundamental legal affirmation of equality. Now, Rancie`re argues that there are
different ways of conceiving of the contradiction between minor and major premise:
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the first takes the form of a ‘strategy of demystification’; whereas the second takes the
form of a ‘strategy of verification.’
A strategy of demystification opposes words to deeds. It holds law to be illusory
(mere words): the equality asserted in law, it suggests, is a mere fac¸ade to mask the
reality of inequality. This, he proposes, ends up in a logic of damnation. The power
struggle literally ends up in ‘damnation’: when dissatisfied with the employers of a
town, workers ‘damned’ the town (they left with bag and baggage and sought to
prevent others from replacing them). Moreover, this strategy starts from inequality
and works on strategies to reduce inequalities. But it is a self-disarming strategy for it
simply ends up creating hierarchies of inequality. It is a strategy which is a demand
upon the other; which puts pressure on the other.
By contrast to this, a strategy of verification opposes word to word and deed to
deed,61 suggesting that either major or minor premise must be upheld. If M. Schwartz
is right to hold the position he holds; the Charter should be deleted; or, the Charter is
correct and M. Schwartz must speak and act differently. The striking workers took
what is treated as a ‘groundless claim’ and turned it into the grounds for a claim*a
space of dispute:
A word has all the power originally given it. This power is in the first place the
power to create a space where equality can state its own claim: equality exists
somewhere; it is spoken of and written about. It must therefore be verifiable. Here is
the basis for a practice that sets itself the task of verifying this equality.62
How can words be verified? On this account it occurs through actions, which here
work as ‘logical proofs.’ The practice of striking seeks to transform the alignment of
forces into a ‘logical confrontation’ that has to demonstrate equality. The strike of
1833 included demand for ‘relations of equality’ with masters: ‘there are masters, but
masters are not the masters of their workers.’ Social relations are unequal; and a legal
relation exists in the form of an inscription of equality in Declaration of Rights of
Man and in the Preamble to the Charter; which must engender a new reality:
It is an equality enshrined as a potentiality in legal/political texts, then translated,
displaced and maximized in everyday life. Nor is it the whole of equality: it is a way
of living out the relation between equality and inequality, of living it and at the same
time displacing it in a positive way. This is the definition of a struggle for equality
which can never be merely a demand upon the other, nor a pressure put upon him,
but always simultaneously a proof given to oneself.63
Proving to the other that there is only one world and that one can prove the
legitimacy of one’s actions within it, means first of all proving this to oneself.64
Hence this movement emerges from a minority status by proving that its members
belongs to society; it proceeds not though a founding of a counter-power but by
demonstrating a capacity which is also a demonstration of community. Before moving
on it is important to note a distinctive, important feature of Rancie`re’s argument,
namely the emphasis he places on the specificity of what may count as politics, as a
challenge to the dominant order. As mentioned earlier and is underlined in the
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historical examples on which he draws, not all challenges or contention counts as
political for Rancie`re. More precisely, he characterizes politics as: ‘a mode of expression
that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically
heterogeneous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption
that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the
equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.’65 Hence, politics proper
demonstrates the ‘sheer contingency of the order,’ and while it makes visible the
presupposition of equality, this always occurs in specific cases, with reference to specific
miscounts and not simply as a result of some ontological possibility or constitutive
openness. This indeed, is one of the distinctive strengths of Rancie`re’s work.66
What conclusions may we draw from this discussion for our concern with voice?
Whereas the account of the slave revolt on the Aventine Hill, and Nora’s relation to
Torvald alert us to the ever-present possibility of its deprivation, the account of the
1833 strike more clearly draws attention to vigorous interactions between new publics
and institutions. Not treating the space of argumentation as always already open,
Rancie`re’s account focuses on the actual mechanisms through which new claims
become visible as claims: the verification of claims that succeed in making claims
audible because it shifts the very terrain of argumentation. From this it is clear that
Rancie`re shares Bohman’s concern with the limitations of mere ‘piecemeal resistance,’
hence his focus on the possibilities and indeed the necessity to shift the terrain of
argumentation itself. As his and many other historical examples show, the very
shifting of the terrain of argumentation consists in an institutional entrenching of
claims in the most significant sense of the term: voice is present where previously only
noise was audible.67 We have moved from a situation of domination, of deprivation of
voice, to one where domination is challenged and voice is gained. The significance of
this shift in emphasis should not be underestimated. One is no longer here on a terrain
that is characterized as one in which ‘freedoms are granted the slave,’ but where the
dominated claim their freedoms and take their rights.68
VOICE: THE TWOFOLD CHARACTER OF ITS DEPRIVATION
These arguments and examples discussed provide useful illustrations of two
dimensions, each of which has to be addressed for us to come to a fuller
understanding of the possibilities of radical pluralization when thought through the
category of voice. On the one hand, I have suggested that what is at stake here is the
very possibility of speaking and of being heard. On the other hand, I have argued that
attention needs to be given to the mechanisms through which inchoate senses of
wrong are articulated and become visible in the public sphere. In other words, we are
dealing with a situation in which we need to address ‘unrepresentable,’ heterogeneous
or inchoate ‘demands,’ that is, demands that fall outside of the extant terrain of
representation, where there is a deprivation of voice. Such demands have a twofold
character that could usefully be expressed in terms of the ontic-ontological
distinction69:
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(1) On the one hand, they are representative of the impossibility to fully represent
the social as such; they are witness to, so to speak, of the impossibility of a full
representation.70 In this sense they have an ontological status.71
(2) On the other hand, they are also ontical in character: those demands that cannot
find expression in this particular order. They are demands that cannot be
brought into play in a particular imaginary/order of representation, since they
clash, contingently, with the principles organizing the domain of representation.
What is important here is that neither the ontological nor the ontic does or should
predominate. Rather, they are to be conceived of as constituted in relations of mutual
imbrication. Analytically, the emphasis here is on the movement from invisibility to
visibility, from inaudibility to audibility, from noise to voice, that has this twofold
character. My central argument is that unless we take account of both of these
dimensions we cannot escape, on the one hand, the limitations of conventional
pluralist forms of representation nor, on the other hand, the limits of an overweening
ontologizing of politics.
Let us now draw out what is required if one is to take on board the full implications
of the ontological dimension, since it also has important consequences for the way in
which we think about and treat the ontical level. First, as we have seen, acknowl-
edgment of the argument concerning the impossibility of full representation shifts
attention to the need to focus on the movement from invisibility to visibility. It is
important to be clear about what is at stake here. It is not a matter of simply
highlighting a set of ontological possibilities; rather, it is a matter of making visible
the importance of the practices constitutive of that movement from invisibility to
visibility. As I have argued, this requires serious analytical engagement with the fact
that spaces of argumentation are not simply always already available for the
inscription of more and more demands. For new demands to appear on the stage,
the space of argumentation itself has to be reconfigured. This is a crucial structural
feature, which needs to be considered if one is serious about democracy beyond
the representation of already existing positions, beyond the representation of given
identities, interests, and concerns. Analytical tools for this exploration can be gleaned
from a range of theorists, and a variety of approaches are available here. Above we
have looked at one such candidate, namely Rancie`re’s analysis with its focus on
different strategies to reconfigure spaces of argumentation, which highlights the
crucial importance of the world-disclosive character of political contestation.72
Moving onto the ontic level where we deal with representation of a plurality of
voices, the analytical focus in democratic theory and practice needs to be enlarged to
consider the representation, in a wider sense, of claims and demands arising in the
wider public sphere. Here we need to get rid of prejudices concerning the politics of
contention that still limit critical engagement with this terrain.73 In opposition to
attempts to develop a logical language to perfect ordinary language, Wittgenstein has
argued that ordinary language is perfectly in order. So it is with political languages.
Rather than seeking to deny the ordinary human voice, analytical attention to the
question of voice in all its dimensions and complexity suggests that not only are
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ordinary and often marginalized peoples capable of expressing their demands in
rational and intelligible terms, but they are also able to do so critically. Wittgenstein’s
use of the ordinary voice often unsettles. So it is with political arguments expressed
and articulated on the terrain of mass politics. As is well known, prior to the
eighteenth century, ‘democracy’ as a term was used routinely ‘as a term of abuse to
refer to the ‘‘people’’ assembling together and demanding a direct voice in the
specific manner in which they were governed’; democracy was condemned as
‘popular, contentious’ and ill-suited to modern conditions.74 Macpherson character-
ized this worry as a particularly liberal fear of the masses. If we are going to take
the wider terrain of wider contentious politics seriously as a terrain of political
argumentation and negotiation, which potentially has positive, critical and world-
disclosive implications for the traditional institutional spheres in which democratic
representation is played out, then these prejudices have to be questioned. Without
such a questioning we run the risk of remaining blind to the fact that contentious
politics is not merely or necessarily piecemeal*although no doubt it could be*but
often results in significant institutional shifts, which are not only present, but also
amenable to systematic analysis. Rather than treating the terrain of contentious
politics as, per definition, problematic, unreasonable, ‘wild,’ and a wasteland of non-
reflective non-deliberation,75 close attention, both to the ways in which new spaces of
argumentation are opened up and to the voicing of demands brings us to the contrary
conclusion. Instead of a lack of deliberation and reflection, we in fact have very
articulate processes of argumentation and extremely reflective engagements that are
able to give expression to deeply felt senses of injustice and wrongs.
In this respect it is important that there is a significant body of work that focus
theoretical attention on the processes and mechanisms through which demands are
articulated into broader political discourses. For instance, Laclau in his recent work
argues that the minimal unit of social analysis is the category of ‘demand,’ which
presupposes that a social group is not a homogeneous group or referent, but rather
‘that its unity should . . . be conceived as an articulation of heterogeneous demands.’76
Demands, for Laclau, tend to start as requests, addressed to the institutions of power.
When those demands are ignored or not responded to, these requests are turned into
claims, which may be addressed to or against institutions.77 An account of the
articulation of demands also allows us to question the notion that ideas are simply
‘transmitted’ from one domain to another, from the informal to the formal political
sphere. The very metaphor of transmission serves to occlude the complex political
processes involved in forging together of demands and of their articulation into
political projects that may inform, strengthen or indeed challenge the existing shape
of political debate.78 As we have seen, this process, moreover, also involves the
constitution of the identity of the claimants and that of the addressee of the claim.79
Analytically, such engagement presupposes some conception of subjectivity that is
able to distinguish between the different ‘subject positions’ inhabited by any one
individual, and ‘the subject as such,’ where the emphasis is on the impossibility of ever
achieving a full representation.80 Once this conceptual distinction is in place, one
could avoid collapsing subject positions into the place of the subject,81 and voice into
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represented demands. Keeping open this gap is not a mere feature of ontic-political
life.82 It is a precondition for a critical engagement with questions of representation,
for it facilitates awareness of the distance between the ontic and the ontological,
between the fact of this representation*of individuals, groups or demands*and
representation as such, as mechanisms of inscription that can never fully capture that
which is being inscribed in the space of representation, that opens the critical space of
a radicalized democratic pluralization.83 Hence, deprivation of voice is always both an
ontic and ontological possibility, and this should be reflected in the way in which we
think of democracy and our critical engagements with democratic practices. Let me
thus, conclude with some of the implications of this excursus on voice are for thinking
about democracy more generally.
DEMOCRACY RETHOUGHT
Voice is a complex element of thinking and its experience. Tracing voice, we may be
able to expand upon our possibilities for being free.84
If we not only take the demand for the representation of different voices, but also the
critical engagement with deprivation of voice seriously, and if, moreover, we think of
voice as constitutively divided, what does this imply for the manner in which we think
of democracy and of the critical work that our conceptions of democracy are expected
to do? As many commentators have noted, not only recently, but as far back as 20 or
30 years ago, our dominant conceptions of democracy*be they liberal, deliberative or
radical*reflect and contain many context-specific dimensions, which may potentially
be as limiting as they are emancipatory. In this sense, it is useful to remind ourselves
that the term democracy, as Tully notes, ‘formerly stood for any ad hoc assembly of
people in negotiation’ and came to be associated with ‘representative democracy’ only in
the late eighteenth century.85 Reminding ourselves of the historical contingency of our
institutional arrangements has the advantage of opening up the possibility to think
more creatively about democracy in a comparative perspective. In order to be able to
recuperate and maintain the critical, world-disclosive role of contentious democratic
politics, our very conception of democracy needs to be more ‘minimal,’ closer simply
to the idea of ‘having a say over the way one is governed.’
Such a shift requires a different conception of the grammar of democracy.
Historically, this possibility can be situated in the lineage of radical conceptions of
democracy that are opposed to a reduction of democracy to a specific set of procedures.
One such conception of democracy treats it as practical and processual, but not
procedural.86 Democracy is constituted in and through practices; it is always
incomplete and in process.87 Although more or less institutionalized forms of rule
may develop from it, rule-formation is not conceived of as the telos of democracy.
Conceiving of democracy in this way enables one to focus on those dimensions of
political argumentation and subject formation inherent in practices of contestation,
claim-making and negotiation that are not reducible to, nor occur in the sites associated
with traditional representative democratic institutions. Although struggles in and over
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the latter are crucial, democracy cannot be limited to these struggles, and they even
exist in the absence of such institutions. Not to recognize this is to deny the existence of
most of what one may want to count as democratic struggles in our contemporary
world. Crucial to these practices of contestation*embodied in the variety of attempts
to exert control over the way one is governed*is an ethos of questioning, responding,
negotiating, challenging, and disruption. This critical ethos focuses on the activities of
citizen-subjects, who are not satisfied to let others speak for them and who question the
ordering of prevailing institutions and practices of governance.
On this reading, then, democratic activity does not presuppose the existence of
elaborate systems of rules and law imbedded in particular institutional forms. To put
it differently, people are not democrats by virtue of the existence of institutions, laws
and rights. They become democratic subjects by exercising their capacities for
questioning, affirming, negotiating, and contesting the regimes and micro-practices
of governance that shape and limit their lives. Now, if democracy is conceived of in
this sense, then the analysis of democratic practices and activities must take the form
of attentiveness to the specificities of the actual practices, traditions and forms of
contestation that challenge divergent forms of domination. Critical practices do not
take a singular form, and the forms of subjectivity they inspire necessarily also vary
widely.88 I would suggest that this means that we ought not to prejudge either the
sites where democracy may erupt or the actors who may engage in such activities.89
The terrain of democratic contention is an uneven one, marked by asymmetries
between participants. Attentiveness to the very processes through which democratic
demands are formed and expressed, and the way in which such practices of claim-
making are also constitutive of the identities of the individuals and groups involved
in them, does not lead to an uncritical acceptance of those asymmetries. Rather, as
I have argued, they are more often the sites where wrongs become visible, where
domination is questioned, and where the limits of traditional ways of thinking about
democracy, representation and pluralism are shown, in the Wittgensteinian sense.
My wager is that if we take seriously these sites and demands, the voices in which
they are expressed and the challenges they pose to us, we also need to rethink the
way in which we conceptualize democracy and the critical tasks of democratic
theorists.
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to which Jacques Rancie`re returns repeatedly affirms the rarity of proper political
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the expense of contentious activities that do have the potential to question and to
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87. The incompleteness of democracy is not here understood in the Habermasian sense of
the unfinished project of modernity. Rather, I draw on Derrida’s account of democracy-
to-come.
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